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Conditionality and
Challenge of Negotiations
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As the first candidate for the EU membership from the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and
a forerunner from the region for the EU integration, Croatia is expected to demonstrate its ability to
fulfil the remaining criteria for starting the negotiations. Appropriate respond requires additional
immediate and future efforts, not only because the date for the start of negotiations has still not been
defined, but because of the country's own development. However, the assessment of Croatia 's readiness
to integrate into the EU will depend to greatest extent on success of internal reforms, ability and quality
of implementation, but the external framework might significantly help the country to pass this exam
more successfully.




The factor of political readiness of the EU to
integrate additional new members should not be ne-
glected. The fifth, eastern enlargement did not pro-
duce major negative effect which is a good signal
for the continuation of the process, although a repli-
cation of the previous "success story" could not be
guaranteed. The dynamism and new views of the ten
new member states enriched the Union, but the old
"mental map" still exists. On the other hand, before
the potential accession of Croatia takes place, an-
other enlargement will happen in 2007. It seems that
with the signing of the Accession Treaty with Bul-
garia and Romania the integration fatigue was over-
come to a certain extent. Therefore Croatia needs to
use the best of institutional memory of the new mem-
ber states and combine it with its own potentials in
order to speed up the process and achieve the inter-
nal readiness for the integration.
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2. Towards negotiations
and the EU membership
Reaching the level of internal readiness by the
end of 2007 and full membership in 2009, is a target
date of the Croatian Government for the EU integra-
tion in Croatia'. The country made progress in prepa-
rations for integration since 2000 and the status of the
candidate for the EU membership, achieved in 2004,
gave Croatia the attribute of the forerunner among the
countries of the Stabilisation and Association Proc-
ess (SAP). According to the economic development
and the overall achieved level of preparations for the
EU integration, Croatia is high above the average of
the SAP countries. However, there are a number of
other steps to be undertaken on the path towards the
EU, together with the fulfilment of the last remaining
political criteria being in the first place.
Integration into the EU is a priority in the
Government programme'. Croatian Government es-
timates that it might need less time for negotiations
than the former candidates, having in mind the
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achieved level of preparations combined with possi-
bility of using the already existing knowledge, ex-
perience and the institutional memory of the previ-
ous enlargement.
In brief, Croatia's progress towards the Euro-
pean Union is grounded within the Stabilisation and
Association Process and the SAP instruments made
basis for integration preparation. The Stabilisation
and Association Agreement (SAA) between Croatia
and the EU and its member states was signed in Oc-
tober 2001, while the process of ratification in mem-
ber states was concluded in September 2004. The
SAA entered into force on 1February 2005, together
with the Protocol 7 on enlargement'. Before it, trade
and transport provisions of the SAA have been ap-
plied as of 1 January 2002, through the Interim
Agreement on trade and related issues, and came
officially into force on 1 March 2002.
After Croatia's application for membership in
the EU (February 2003), the Council called upon the
European Commission on 14 April 2003 to submit
an opinion (avis) on Croatia's application. The an-
swers on the questionnaire were submitted in Octo-
ber 2003 while the avis was finalised in April 2004.
The main findings of the avis" underlined that Croatia
was a functioning democracy with stable institutions
guaranteeing the rule of law; functioning market
economy which should be able to cope with com-
petitive pressure within the Union in the medium
term, with a precondition that continues implement-
ing reforms. It was also noted that Croatia should be
in the position to take the other obligations of the
membership in the medium term, if considerable ef-
forts are made to align its legislation with the acquis
and ensure the implementation and enforcement.
The Opinion was accompanied by the Euro-
pean Partnership for Croatia' which identified the
short and medium term priorities during the prepa-
ration for accession. In June 2004, the European
Council confirmed the status of Croatia as a candi-
date country for membership and brought a decision
on opening negotiations on full membership.
The Pre-accession strategy for Croatia (Octo-
ber 2004) together with the proposed negotiation
framework opened the door for the access to the pre-
accession funds in 2005. The European Council in
December 2004 decided to start the accession talks
on March 17, 2005, conditioned by full cooperation
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). However, the consensus
of the 25 EU member states on evaluating the coop-
eration of Croatia and the ICTY was not reached and
the final decision to start negotiations was not made.
The new starting date for negotiations has not
been defined yet". It is highly conditioned with the
full co-operation with the ICTY and handing over
the General Gotovina to the Hague Tribunal. The
ad-hoc Task Force was established on 23 March to
examine the progress of Croatia's cooperation with
the ICTY. The next step would be the implementa-
tion of the Action Plan, defined in six points by the
Croatian Government in order to make progress re-
garding the fulfilment of this particular condition.
Understood in wider context, it is a question of real
confirmation of the credibility of practical implemen-
tation of the pro-European policy in Croatia.
Postponed negotiations contributed to the al-
ready existing rise ofEuro-pessimism in Croatia. Af-
ter the period of strong public support for the process
in Croatia in early 2000 (most of the public opinion
surveys carried out since 2000 on a six month basis
showed that around 70% of the population? have posi-
tive attitude towards the integration), recent surveys
indicated significant decrease in public opinion sup-
port. Namely, in 2004 the support for the EU fell to
51% of the population while 39% of citizens were
opposed. This means that communicating the EU in-
tegration issues to wider public is extremely impor-
tant and very sensitive question at the moment. On
the other hand, there is a paradox that the public sup-
port in the EU for the next Southeast European en-
largement is growing, particularly within the new
member states". It is a sign that the EU citizens have
the impression that the last enlargement was a suc-
cess and that there were no major problems in inte-
grating 10 new member states in May 2004. There-
fore communication with public is one of the most
important issues to be dealt with in Croatia at the
moment. It is necessary to provide well developed
communication strategy focused on different target
groups; information campaigns, strengthened educa-
tion activities, particularly those focused on media.
The start of negotiations is important not only
for Croatia, but also for the other countries of the re-
gion, which means high responsibility in responding
to the conditionality issues. The start of negotiations
will be confirmation of the progress achieved in meet-
ing the goals set by the SAA, defined in Copenhagen
criteria and arising from the Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Process, but the key for it remains on the side
of Croatia. It should enable the country to continue
more effectively the internal reforms, supported by
the EU pre-accession programmes. On the other hand,
since progress in the EU integration is convincing
motive for changes and the strongest cohesion factor
in the SEE countries, Croatia's negotiations have enor-
mous importance for the region - it could motivate
the other countries to follow the example and build
stable democratic structures, capable for meeting the
European Union membership criteria.
JULY - DECEMBER 2004 SOUTHEAST EUROPE ON THE WAY INTO THE EU 9~9
3. Political criteria as a test of
credibility in implementing
the European policy
The opening of negotiations is highly condi-
tioned, not only by the need of providing clear re-
sults of full cooperation with the ICTY confirming
the respect of legal obligations, but also by the need
to demonstrate the rule of law as a basic principle of
relationship in Croatian society, the full respect of
international agreements and thus confirm the cred-
ibility of the European policy of the Government.
The main priorities for Croatia were set by the
Copenhagen European Council of 1993 and the
Stabilisation and Association Process". It is evident
that the process of enlargement developed the criteria
for the EU accession which has some specific require-
ments for the SAP countries, particularly when it
comes to political issues. Apart from the basic pre-
condition of democracy and rule of law (including
strengthening of the judicial system, improving the
fight against corruption and improving the function-
ing of the public administration together with free-
dom of media), Croatia and the other SAP countries
must fulfil some other preconditions that were not
envisaged for the former candidates, for the simple
reason that the need for overcoming such problems
simply did not exist in the case of other candidates.
This is the case with cooperation with the respect for
minority rights, return of refugees and regional co-
operation, particularly the full co-operation with the
ICTY. Co-operation with the ICTY is the most im-
portant precondition, but the other conditionality is-
sues should not be neglected, although Croatia has
made significant progress in the previous years.
Thus the international community mostly for
security reasons looks at joining of the SAP coun-
tries to the EU through a double magnifying glass.
Croatia is expected to be the frontrunner of the en-
tire region on its European road, but also the success
in the acceptance of the European criteria and stand-
ards, as the criteria and standards of a liberal de-
mocracy model. Monitoring its development, the EU
concluded that despite some deficiencies in the de-
velopment of some aspects of the system of liberal
democracy, Croatia has deserved to be trusted with
such a role in the process of the stabilization of the
entire area and that it would be able to play that role
much more efficiently as a full-fledged EU member
than if it stayed outside. Besides economic and po-
litical aspects, the geostrategic aspect was also as-
sessed in this matter, concerning the fact that with
the entrance of Croatia, the whole EU comes to a
very uncertain, relatively long non-transparent bor-
der with Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and
Montenegro, which could have negative impact on
its overall stability. Therefore, there were also ideas
that Croatia should be left in the position of a secu-
rity buffer state against non-transparent and uncer-
tain area to the east of its borders. However, when
the security of this area started to be considered in
the light of wider global threats such as terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, drug and people traf-
ficking, etc., it became clear that it would be unreal-
istic to expect from a small country to be able to
deal with a combination of autochthonous local and
global aspects of security all alone and without in-
stitutional support of a wider circle of countries such
as full-fledged EU members. All the more so because
Croatia still feels the consequences of two simulta-
neous shocking processes it has faced since the be-
ginning of the 1990s, those being defence from an
armed aggression and the transition process. Such
processes to a large extent relativise many civiliza-
tion values and some time is needed for the life to
regain normal civilization balance.
Relativization of civilization values is actu-
ally characteristic to a varying extent for the entire
area of South Eastern Europe and is a consequence
of dissolution of a state, which is a frequent case in
history. In the light of new challenges brought about
by the current processes in international relations,
such areas become even more sensitive and a very
attractive medium for different transactions of vari-
ous illegal businesses especially if they are performed
within the framework of new unconventional threats.
Unreliable and still organizationally and profession-
ally weak democratic institutions of these states along
with insufficiently efficient and reliable repressive
services are not appropriate guarantee for control of
the permeability of different criminal "routes" that
pass through these very sensitive areas. This particu-
larly refers also to the administration of justice in all
of these states including Croatia. Still, in spite of all
those weaknesses, Croatia has nevertheless made the
greatest progress in building of necessary democratic
thus also security institutions, and the EU assesses
that with its assistance, i.e., through a full-fledged
membership in the Union, this country could become
factor of stability and security in the region.
However, that "privileged" position also has
its demanding implications. Namely, Croatia should
more clearly, more sincerely, with more credibility
than other countries in the region prove that it is able
to play such a role, i.e., that it is able to accept the
standards and criteria of the EU in that segment as
well. The subject under discussion is democratic
control of armed forces and security sector. Only
democratically controlled armed forces and security
sector could be the guarantee of the efficiency of
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repressive structures in particular country in the
struggle against unconventional threats. These forces
must not on any account rise above the society, i.e.,
above democratically elected representatives of
power. Taking the broad picture, not only that demo-
cratic authority must control repressive structures but
it must make it possible for the civil society as well,
i.e., for media, academic and scientific institutions,
various nongovernmental organizations, etc. The
emphasis is on the democratically elected legisla-
tive power, but other parts of society have also some-
thing to say about those relations with the aim to
build such a network of control institutions that
would be a lasting obstacle to any attempt to put those
services outside the democratic space. Thus repres-
sive structures cannot be a support to holding on
power of any ruling set. On the contrary, they should
serve wider state interests instead of particular in-
terests of a party which is in power in certain period.
The subject is depolitization or, as some say,
departisation of those structures, which is the simul-
taneous compatible standard of both Euro-Atlantic
structures, the EU and NATO.
All this should be kept in mind when the re-
quests of the EU are commented that Croatia should
fully cooperate with the International Tribunal in The
Hague before the beginning of the negotiations,
which is the euphemism for the extradition of the
fugitive retired general to that institution. If there is
any hint of doubt that some parts of security or intel-
ligence services, and perhaps even some parts of
armed forces, have been involved in the escape of
the retired general, it is implied that democratically
elected government, either current or former, does
not control these services. It means that it is not able
to adjust to that standard of the EU, i.e., one of the
essential standards of the model of liberal democ-
racy. When all this is related to the strategic goal
that precisely such a country should be a factor of
security and stability as well as a democratic exam-
ple to the others in the region in which the building
of the security structure is a priority task, then the
entire case ceases to be the case of one man, it be-
comes important element of regional and global se-
curity.
The reason why the respect of that standard is
insisted upon in the case of Croatia is the conse-
quence of the fact that it is just on the threshold of
the full-fledged membership while other countries
of the region are still far from it. If for example the
state community of Serbia and Montenegro were in
that stage of joining, the pressure would concentrate
on the extradition of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko
Mladic. However, since that country is far from en-
trance in any stage of joining the Euro-Atlantic struc-
tures, the international community is of the opinion
that at the moment the time should not be spent on
that country. Still, both from democratic and secu-
rity viewpoint, Croatia is quite another thing, and
that is why all those elements are carefully dissected
that can help in testing the strategic option accord-
ing to which this country can develop into the "pro-
ducer" of a security system instead of its "consumer"
and "user".
The importance of regional cooperation can
be considered as a practical mean for promoting rec-
onciliation among the people in the region. The very
important segment of the regional cooperation is the
economic one, but there is also the problem of the
cooperation in combating organized crime and cor-
ruption and the problem in other segments of justice
and home affairs. Results achieved in this kind of
cooperation would have a positive effect on other
issues of political criteria such as, for instance, re-
turn of refugees and minority rights.
Apart from that, some other political criteria
are crucial, as for instance, the improvement offunc-
tioning of public administration, strengthening the
judicial system, enhancing the freedom of expres-
sion including the democratic functioning of the
media. Croatia has, however, achieved relevant
progress in implementing those criteria, so the main
problem that still remains is the cooperation with
the ICTY.
Through different bilateral and multilateral
mechanisms Croatia contributes to the stability and
co-operation in South-Eastern Europe by assuming
the role of a political and economic model in the
region. Within the Stability Pact the Memorandum
for Free Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation was
signed with the countries of SEE end wider region
(2002)10.Croatia joined the Memorandum of Under -
standing on Energy Market and thus contributed to
the strengthening of regional energy market (2003).
In 2005 the agreement on Energy Community be-
tween EU and SEE countries was initialled and is
planned to be signed by the end of the year.
Finally, it is necessary to stress that the fulfil-
ment of compliance with the political criteria will
be monitored in later stages of integration with the
EU, as well. As announced in the Pre-Accession
Strategy, the accession negotiations may be sus-
pended in the case of serious and persistent breach
of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect of
human rights and freedoms, and the rule of law. Al-
though the mentioned suspension clause was not
explicitly underlined in pre-accession documents of
former candidates, it could be understood as the out-
come of the experiences of the previous enlarge-
ment".
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4. Progress in SAA
implementation
Apart from political questions and regional
cooperation, the first stage of SAA implementation
was focused on technical harmonisation of legal
acts". Development of capacities for the implemen-
tation and institution building are the key issues at
the moment. This means that it is crucial for Croatia
at this phase to move from technical adoption of le-
gal acts to real implementation and development of
policies.
Namely, Croatia has started approximation of
legislation to that of the Community from the day of
signing the SAA (October 2001). In the first stage
approximation was focused on fundamental elements
of the internal market as well as on other trade-re-
lated areas and was gradually extended to other parts
of the acquis communautaire. However, the screen-
ing process will show to which extent this initial
adjustment was successful and where the remaining
potential gaps are.
Having in mind the economic criteria, Croatia
should sustain prudent, stability oriented macro-eco-
nomic policies, accelerate enterprise restructuring
and privatisation, and reduce barriers to market en-
try and exit, accelerate land reform, and continue
structural reforms in public finance 13. This should
be accompanied by the progress in raising the abil-
ity to assume obligations for membership in all par-
ticular areas of internal market and in sectoral poli-
cies.
Croatian economy has achieved a consider-
able degree of macroeconomic stability with low
inflation 14. Major macroeconomic indicators place
Croatia far at the helm of the SAP countries, but also
in mid-range of the new member states. Croatia is a
small economy with a population of 4.4 million and
with the GDP per capita of 6,220 euro ", which
amounts to around 29% of the EU average. As a com-
parison, the average level of GDP pic in other SAP
countries was less than 2,000 euro (in 2003)16while
Bulgaria and Romania reached the level of around
2,300 euro'". The areas in which Croatia is facing
difficulties are high budget deficit and increasing
public debt. At the same time, it is extremely impor-
tant to translate the existing macroeconomic stabil-
ity into sustainable development of the real economy
sector, by accentuating especially faster progress in
structural reforms, privatisation and restructuring.
The Pre-accession Economic Programme
(PEP), that was prepared in October 2004 by the
Croatian Government, made the ground for economic
reforms to be undertaken within the period 2005-
2007. It was the answer to the reform agenda devel-
oped within the European Partnership, focused on
the most important economic issues, including mac-
roeconomic development, public finances, structural
reforms and other areas. According to it, the expected
macroeconomic indicators for the 2007 areas follows:
the GDP real growth is expected to rise to 4.6% (3.9%
in 2004), while inflation should be kept at the same
level as in 2004 (2.2%). The unemployment rate
should be reduced from 14.9% in 2004 to 12.1% in
2007, according to ILO. The budget deficit is ex-
pected to be reduced from the 4.5% of GDP in 2004
to 2.9% while public debt should be 51.0% (52.8%
in 2004)18.
However, the estimation of the European Com-
mission regarding the budget deficit is somewhat dif-
ferent, due to the fact that the revenues in 2004 were
lower than expected. The forecast assumes the reduc-
tion of the deficit to 4.4% in 2005 and 3.9 in 200619.
Croatia's economy is relatively good, although
not enough integrated with the EU. However, mar-
ket mechanisms still need significant improvements.
The SAA set up a timetable for trade Iiberalisation
of goods and services. As its consequence and due
to bilateral agreements, Croatia has free trade agree-
ments with more than thirty countries. However,
Croatia still has low level of exports pic, amounting
approximately 1,400 US$ in 2003 (with the exports
to the EU amounting 52.7% in the total exports").
For comparison, the export pic in Slovenia is over
US$ 6000, Czech Republic 4000 US$, Hungary 3000
US$. Among others, the reason for it is low com-
petitiveness of the country. Increasing competitive-
ness of the Croatian industry and trade on the inter-
national market is needed. Trade Iiberalisation meas-
ures need to be accompanied by efficient structural
reforms, and fiscal policy measures. Furthermore,
the expected participation in pan-European diago-
nal cummulation of rules of origin will be extremely
important not only for Croatia, but for the SAP re-
gion as well.
Increased investment is one of the most sig-
nificant advantages of the EU accession and will have
crucial role in the future development of the Croatia
and the region, as an impetus for the economic re-
covery, speeding up economic growth and reducing
poverty". Croatia's progress towards the EU inte-
gration contributed to increased foreign investors'
interest. Croatia has largest share of 50% in the FDI
inflow into the SAP region, with the annual average
share ofFDI to the GDP of 5.6% (1997-2003), al-
though the main type of capital inflow is still mostly
linked with privatisation and does not represent
greenfield investment. However, the overall inflow
to the region is low (the average of 80 euro pic as
compared to 230 pic euro that was recorded in the
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former candidates from Central and Eastern Europe
in the period 1997-2002)22. In recent years, Croatia
has become one of the investors in the SAP region
(e.g. the country is a top investor in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Croatian firms are expanding to
Serbia & Montenegro market"),
Regarding the technical assistance, Croatia has
benefited from the CARDS programme during the
past years. The annual contribution from the CARDS
programme is around 60 million euro, allocated to
the economic and social development, democratic
stabilisation, justice and home affairs and adminis-
trative capacity building". Apart from the national
CARDS component, Croatia is beneficiary of the
CARDS Regional Programme through which joint
projects are implemented together with other coun-
tries of the region.
The pre-accession strategy opened the door
for the access to the PHARE, ISPA 25 and SAPARD26
programmes in 2005 which will be available for
Croatia until 2007. Namely, the new Financial Per-
spectives 2007-2013 envisage the new Pre-Acces-
sion Instrument (IPA) for the candidates (Turkey,
Croatia) and potential candidates (remaining coun-
tries of the Western Balkans). As it is announced,
the IPA should supersede the existing instruments
(PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD), simplifying the manage-
ment programmes for accession countries.
However, Croatia needs to develop institutions
and strengthen its capacities to absorb the expected
additional support from the EU funds. Preparations
are underway for the effective use of EU technical
assistance as well as for the effective implementa-
tion of projects within the Phare, ISPA and SAPARD
programmes.
5. Concluding remarks
Credibility in implementing the European
standards, particularly regarding the political crite-
ria is the key precondition for Croatia to start nego-
tiations. Such conditionality is an issue that will be
on the agenda not only during the preparations and
the course of negotiations, but possibly even after
the closing of negotiations, as it is the case with
Bulgaria and Romania.
The speed of integration will depend on effi-
ciency in the implementation of the reforms and ac-
ceptance of the European standards in practice, hav-
ing in mind the country's own achievements and
progress. Finally, the factor of political willingness
of the EU to integrate additional new members should
not be neglected.
Therefore efficiency in the implementation
and continuation of reforms will be most relevant
factor for the success of Croatia, having in mind very
tight schedule for achieving the target date 2007/09.
The stage of achieved implementation of the SAA,
progress in adopting the principles of the acquis,
together with the overall macroeconomic picture of
the country and the stage of reforms (economic, ju-
dicial and administrative) make a good starting point
for fulfilling the remaining Copenhagen criteria, only
in case that the country continues to implement its
reform programme in the same speed, in order to
remove remaining weaknesses. However, there re-
mains a lot of work to be done.
Croatia needs to make steps towards defining
and implementing the member-state building strat-
egy", The experience of the last round of enlarge-
ment showed that at the heart of the member-state
building strategy is the need to move on quickly from
the formal adoption of legislation to the development
of the capacity to implement it28. The development
of the policy (coordination) capacity will be crucial
in the coming period. During the accession process
it is necessary to make preconditions for overcom-
ing the implementation gap that is a problem even in
some new member states.
This also implies the continuation of institu-
tion building process, with creation of new institu-
tions and the strengthening of the existing, supported
by the "screening" mechanism; development ofna-
tional strategic documents necessary for the absorp-
tion of pre-accession programmes.
Furthermore, coordinated work on continua-
tion of accelerated implementation of the SAA obli-
gations together with structural reforms (particularly
in judiciary, privatisation, fiscal consolidation, so-
cial services, pension and health reform and in some
other areas), are preconditions for the success of join-
ing the EU in the next wave of enlargement, after
Bulgaria and Romania. Continuation of reforms in
judiciary and public administration is crucial for the
success of integration into the EU.
Increased investment is considered to be one
of the most significant advantages of the EU acces-
sion, but the strongest inflows and effects were ex-
perienced before the membership. Therefore the strat-
egy for integration must be linked with the strategy
for attracting the foreign direct investment, aiming
to channel the FDI inflow into new production, in-
dustry and infrastructure particularly through
greenfield investment.
Special attention needs to be paid to human
resources management - the well trained staff should
be kept in the process of negotiations from the be-
ginning to the end. Institutional capacity building is
one of the crucial issues for the overall success of
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the process. It is extremely important to keep the
process transparent during negotiations, without too
1 The target date for membership in 2009, before the elections
for the European Parliament take place, was announced by the
Prime Minister Ivo Sanader at the Crans Montana Forum in
Zagreb, 13 - 15 April 2005.
2 Working Programme of the Government of the Republic of
Croatia 2004-2007, December 23, 2003.
3 The Protocol 7 extended the concessions that were given to
the new candidates bilaterally on the EU 25 and thus the SAA
became applicable to the enlarged EU.
4 Communication from the Commission. Opinion on Croatia's
application for membership of the European Union. COM (2004)
257 final. Brussels, 20 April 2004.
5 Council Decision on the principles and conditions in the Euro-
pean Partnership with Croatia. COM (2004) 275 final.
6 The paper was finalized in May 2005.
7 Since 2000, the Ministry for European Integration has carried
out regular public opinion surveys to examine the level of sup-
port, expectations and knowledge on the EU integration issues.
Nine public opinion surveys have been carried out. The last one
was presented in August 2004. www.meLhr.
8 The results of the Eurobarometer 62 survey (December, 2004)
show that more than a half of the people interviewed (autumn
2004) were in favour of the proposed further enlargement in the
coming years (53%). This was a significant increase, as com-
pared to 37% of the citizens in the EU 15 that had positive re-
sponse before enlargement (spring 2004).
9 Notably, the conditions defined by the Council in its Conclu-
sions of 29 April 1997 and 21-22 June 1999, the content of the
final declaration of the Zagreb Summit of 24 November 2000
and the Thessaloniki agenda.
10 Memorandum was signed with all the SAP countries, Bul-
garia, Romania and Moldova.
11 It nowadays applies to Bulgaria and Romania, in the period
after the countries signed the Accession Treaty.
12 The National Programme for Integration of the Republic of
Croatia into the EU (NPPIEU) has been adopted, as the main
co-ordinating instrument, focusing on all three Copenhagen cri-
teria, with particular emphasis on legal harmonisation. The first
National Programme was adopted for the year 2003 and was
accompanied by similar documents for 2004 and 2005.
high expectations, and to introduce experts to take
part in it.
NOTES
13 These priorities are envisaged for the short-term period by
the European Partnership with Croatia.
14 The European Commission Opinion on Croatia.
15 National Bank of Croatia, April 2005.
16 The Balkans in Europe's future, International Commission
for the Balkans, 2005.
17 Ibidem.
18 Government of the RC. Pre-accession Programme 2005-
2007. Zagreb, October 14th, 2004. pp 10.
19 European Economy. 2005., European Commission; DG Eco-
nomic and Financial Affairs. Economic Forecasts. Spring 2005.
pp 100.
20 Croatian National Bank, September 2004.
21 Recent years showed an increase in foreign interest for the
SEE region: in the period between 1989 and 2003, cumulative
net FDI to the region was about 32 billion US$, which is far be-
low the level of FDI (125 billion US$) directed to CEE and the
Baltics in the same period. FDI inflows have been relatively sta-
ble between 1998-2002 (around 3.5-4 billion US$), while 2003
slowed significant increase to more than 6 billion US$.Source:
Spotlight on South-eastern Europe. An overview of private sec-
tor activity and investment. EBRD, April 2004.
22 The Western Balkans in transition, pp 5.
23 The example is the recent purchase of Frikom, the largest
ice-cream and frozen food manufacturer in Serbia and
Montenegro, by Agrokor, Croatia.
24 Since its introduction in 2000, within the national component
of the CARDS programme in Croatia 113 projects have been
identified with total budget of 155 mil euro (29 of them being in
preparation).
25 ISPA - Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
26 SAPARD - Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and
Rural Development
27 The need for developing such strategy has been identified by
the International Commission on the Balkans, and it focused on
three pillars: developing functioning state administration; creat-
ing common economic space in the region and constituency
building.
28 International Commission on the Balkans. The Balkans in
Europe's Future. pp 30.
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